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  Stochastic Dominance, Entropy and Biodiversity Management 
 
 
  AIn the world of biology, as in the world of finance, diversity is our only hedge 




Conservation organizations, such as the Nature Conservancy, play an important role in 
the  preservation of biodiversity.  According to the Nature Conservancy=s mission statement, its 
goal is: Ato preserve plants, animals and natural communities that represent the diversity of life 
on Earth by protecting the lands and waters they need to survive.@ This type of mission statement 
implies that the focus of conservation organizations is not solely on the ranking of preservation 
projects in terms of returns to biodiversity but also the consideration of those projects in terms of 
risks to biodiversity.  When ranking sites for potential preservation, the Nature Conservancy 
ranks the species or communities present based on their rarity (from “critically important” to 
“demonstrably secure”) and also ranks the likelihood that the species or community will survive 
on that site if it is preserved (from highly likely to highly unlikely) (see Weitzman 1995).   
The selection of the preservation projects is difficult due to the uncertainty of the 
biodiversity associated with individual parcels, the interaction between different preserves and 
the threats to preserved areas.  There are numerous threats to biodiversity, including 
demographic stochasticity, global warming, political uncertainty, poor enforcement of property 
rights, genetic deterioration and natural catastrophes.    
The economic threats to biodiversity fall into two categories, those related to market 
failure and those related to government failure.  The threats related to market failure are those 
that arise when urban, agricultural, forestry, and other uses of land threaten habitat that promotes  
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biodiversity. Those who pursue development of habitat have little incentive to consider the 
positive impacts of biodiversity on private land.  In the case of forestry, for example, logging of 
old growth forests has threatened the spotted owl (Rubin, Helfand, Loomis 1991; Hagan, 
Vincent, and Welle 1992).  Longleaf pine ecosystems are economically disadvantaged relative to 
slash pine forests since their amenity benefits are not considered by private landowners 
(Alavalapati, Stainback, and Carter 2002).  Beach erosion as a result of beach hardening has 
threatened sea turtle nesting habitat (Whitehead 1993). Urbanization and hunting have threatened 
wolves (Chambers and Whitehead 2003).  Numerous studies have measured the benefits of 
preservation of these and other species.   Loomis and White (1996) review a number of such 
studies measuring the external market benefits of specific threatened fish and wildlife species.  
They argue that valuation studies should focus on the benefits of preserving ecosystems and not 
individual species.  Even in the case of anthropocentric valuation, in which humans are 
concerned only about the benefits they receive from a specific species, A...ecological inter-
relationships necessary to support the high-profile species may mean that the entire ecosystem 
must be protected.@ 
Perverse incentives inherent in the Endangered Species Act (ESA) produce a major 
source of government failure as a threat to biodiversity preservation.  There is a lack of 
information about the value of biodiversity on private land. Since designation of an endangered 
species lowers private property values due to restrictions on development, there is little incentive 
for landowners to cooperate with regulators who wish to examine the private property (Polasky, 
Doremus and Rettig 1997). This lack of cooperation limits the global knowledge about 
endangered species, creates uncertainty about the benefits of preservation, and lowers the 
activities related to preservation for risk averse regulators.   
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Another threat to biodiversity related to the ESA is anti-conservation investment 
(Michael and Lueck 2003). Regulated private property is not subject to compensation. In order to 
avoid future regulation under the ESA, a landowner has an incentive to strategically develop 
their private property before the presence of an endangered species is recognized by regulators. 
The development eliminates the species from the property. Without the threat of regulation, the 
optimal time for development is farther into the future, implying that the endangered species 
would be preserved on the private property for a longer time period, possibly allowing greater 
recovery of the population.  
A related threat to biodiversity is the distribution of benefits and costs associated with 
species preservation (Brown and Shogren 1998). The benefits of species preservation are 
dispersed over the entire human population. The high individual costs are concentrated on those 
landowners and business firms that are negatively impacted by preservation (Montgomery, 
Brown, and Darius 1994; Innes, Polasky, and Tschirhart 1998). Even if the aggregate benefits are 
greater than the aggregate costs in a public choice framework, lobbying efforts by those with 
concentrated costs have greater political clout than the quiet masses with relatively low 
individual benefits. Government budget constraints limit the number of species that can be listed 
(Brown and Shogren 1998).  There are cases where high benefits are concentrated in the hands of 
a few individuals or corporations.  For example, biodiversity has value to the pharmaceutical 
industry.  However, even in this case, the marginal benefits of protecting any single plant or 
animal species are low relative to the marginal costs due to the potential for species substitution. 
Therefore, there is little private incentive to preserve biodiversity. 
In the past, environmental policies to protect endangered species have focused on 
economic uncertainty (e.g., the uncertainty of future costs and benefits) while largely ignoring  
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uncertainty arising from environmental factors: natural disasters such as wildfires or  hurricanes 
that destroy habitat, global warming, genetic deterioration, and demographic stochasticity.  A 
greater margin of safety is required if such policies are to be successful in maintaining 
endangered populations.  Obviously, increasing the total size of the population provides 
protection, since a smaller population has a greater probability of varying to zero in the face of a 
disaster or demographic stochasticity.  Another way to provide additional safety is to increase the 
geographic range of the targeted species.  This could be done by preserving larger areas, or 
through the use of redundant preserves, i.e., preserving several geographically diverse areas with 
similar habitats.  This will decrease the probability that the entire population will be struck by the 
same environmental problem (Noss and Cooperrider 1994). 
Ludwig, Hilborn and Walters (1993) illustrate the results of failing to take uncertainty 
into account in the case of an exploitable resource.  Governments regularly regulate harvests of 
such resources in order to achieve a sustainable level of exploitation (maximum sustained yield).  
These authors suggest that this ideal has never, and perhaps can never, be reached.  There is not, 
and we can never expect to achieve, scientific consensus as to what this sustainable harvest rate 
will be.  Political and economic pressures often force greater, rather than smaller, harvests.   The 
populations of harvested species experience natural fluctuation.  During strong periods, there is 
greater investment and increased harvests.  When populations return to normal or below normal 
levels, disinvestment is too politically costly.  The results are high subsidies and persistent over-
harvesting.   Because each system is unique, it is extremely difficult to predict the effects of 
exploitation.  This inability to predict should lead to more caution than is the norm.  What is 
needed are actions robust to the inevitable uncertainties and a degree of hedging in 
environmental policy.   
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As John Madson implies, the uncertainty of the biological world resembles the financial 
world in many ways.  Using this concept as a starting point, we apply financial strategies of 
diversification and stochastic dominance to the process of conserving biodiversity.  We proceed 
as follows.  In section 2, we discuss the difficulties of measuring the returns from biodiversity. 
We then develop a model of population dynamics using the Shannon entropy index as a measure 
of diversity.  Specifically, we develop a model of species dynamics which allows for global and 
specific population shocks.  In section 3, we model the effects of increasing the number of 
parcels on biodiversity and provide an argument for spatially diverse parcels.  Within this 
section, we vary the number of spatially diverse parcels to capture the potential risk 
diversification effects.  Next, in section 4, we discuss the concepts of stochastic dominance as a 
means of project selection, in order to model biodiversity returns and risks.  A Monte Carlo 
experiment is used to perform simulations for ten parcels with 100 distinct species that may 
inhabit each parcel.  We find that stochastic dominance may be a useful theoretical construct to 
rank parcels but it is unable to rank every case.  In the final section, we provide some policy 
implications and the direction of our future work.   
 
2. Biodiversity, Dynamics and Returns 
The interaction of parcels and the potential for risk reductions have clear policy 
implications for conservation organizations.  Conservation organizations range from small 
grassroots organizations to the Nature Conservancy, which is the largest private owner of land in 
the United States.  Within this section, we argue that large conservation organizations face less 
risk in maintaining biodiversity than a relatively small, highly concentrated local organization.  
The advantage of the large conservation organization arises from the tendency to have many  
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spatially diverse projects.  Although organizations, such as the Nature Conservancy, may 
maintain many different preserves to attract potential members and influence the level of 
donations, its members are better off from this diversification.  Specifically, the members benefit 
because a large number of spatially diverse preserves significantly reduces the risk to the overall 
level of biodiversity.  Alternatively, a number of smaller organizations may cooperate in order to 
ensure that a diverse range of projects is preserved. The smaller organizations may exist since 
they may serve to provide a regional focus or a niche focus.   By cooperating unintentionally or 
deliberately, the group of smaller organizations mimics a single, large organization.  In either 
scenario, there exists a spillover public good, in that the risk to biodiversity is reduced through 
either a large single organization or the holdings of numerous smaller organizations.  To 
illustrate the effects of increasing the number of preserves on the overall risk, measured in terms 
of variance of biodiversity, we allow the number of equal sized parcels to increase.  There exists 
a portion of the risk (global shocks) to biodiversity that is common or systematic to all parcels 
and this risk is unaffected by the number of parcels. 
In the financial economics literature, diversification is relatively easy to apply since 
financial returns are well defined.  However, this is not the case for the returns to the 
conservation organization whose goal is to maximize biodiversity.  There are two primary 
indices used to measure species abundance.  The simplest is the Simpson index, SP = 1/Σ(pi)
2, 
where pi represents the proportion of each of i species in the total sample (Simpson, 1949).  The 
Shannon-Weaver index is calculated as SW = -Σ(pi – log(pi)).  Although both indices are widely 
used, they may behave slightly differently.  The Simpson index tends to be more sensitive to 
changes in the equitability of species, while the Shannon-Weaver index responds more to 
changes in the number of species present. (For more details concerning these indices, see  
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Magurran, 1988, Spellerberg, 1991 or Simpson 2002.)  
  While these indices can be useful indicators of the health of an area, a few cautions 
should be mentioned.  Few surveys accurately tally all species due to lack of money, time, and 
available expertise in identifying all species.  Important habitats are often inaccessible.  There are 
also problems concerning the nature of the indices.  Both of the indices discussed here treat all 
species as if they are interchangeable.  A plot made up of native species with a moderate index 
value is considered less healthy than a second plot with a higher index but a greater number of 
exotic invaders.  The indices also ignore the importance of keystone and indicator species.  
Finally, both the Simpson and Shannon indices assume that each species is equally different 
from all other species.  In reality, this is not the case.  For example, two species from the same 
genus are more alike than two species from different families.   The Shannon index gives greater 
diversity value to a plot with many, equally abundant species that are very similar than it would 
to a plot with fewer, but less closely related, species.  One way to measure the degree of 
difference between two species is through a distance function (see Weitzman 1992, 1993 and 
1998; Solow et al. 1993 and Weikard 2002).  The distance between two species may be 
measured in terms of the genetic differences between the two, the time since they branched off 
from some common ancestor or a weighted sum of differences in micro-characteristics.  The 
greater the distance between the two species, the more different they are.  To determine diversity 
of an area using distance functions, a series of pairwise distances between all species present 
must be calculated.  With slight adjustments to the formulation of the distance function, species 
richness and abundance (such as is measured using the Simpson or Shannon index) can be 
incorporated. Because of the computational complexity of using distance functions, we use the 
Shannon Entropy index to measure biodiversity.    
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To examine how biodiversity varies over time, we must specify dynamics for the 
populations of species and the interaction between species.  We model a conservation 
organization as choosing land parcels from H different available parcels.  The conservation 
organization’s objective is to maximize global diversity through parcel management.  Due to a 
limited budget, not all land parcels may be preserved.  To consider optimal parcels, the 
conservation organization must minimize the risk level for a given expected level of biodiversity. 
In addition to distinct parcels, we also assume there are N possible species in nature (each 
species does not necessarily inhabit all parcels).  The population of species i on parcel h at time t 
is denoted:  t h i y , , .  Assuming the minimum population level is satisfied, we model the dynamics 
of the population of species as 










t h j j i t h i t h i m w g b y y µ ν ε ⋅ ⋅ − + ⋅ + ⋅ + = ∑ ∑
= =
−          (1) 
where  J i i b b , 1 , ,...,  represent J parcel specific load factors that impact species i’s population,  t h j , , ε  
represents the j
th factor shock on parcel h at time t.  Parcel-specific shocks may include natural 
disasters such as drought or forest fires.  K i i g g , 1 , ,...,  represent K species global load factors for 
species i,  t k, ν  represents the k
th global factor shock at time t.  Global warming is the most well 
known potential global shock.  Finally,  h i m ,  represents the humankind load factor for species i 
on parcel h,  h w represents the proportion of parcel h preserved by the conservation organization, 






















































































ν  and the humankind shock  
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( ) m N Σ − , 1 ~ µ .  The parcel, global and humankind specific shocks are assumed to be 
independent (i.e.,  ν ε ⊥ h .,  for all h=1,…,H) as are the H parcel specific shock vectors.  Taking 
the expectations of (1) yields the expected population of species i on parcel h at time t or  
  [ ] ( ) , 1 , 1 , , , , h i h t h i t h i m w y y E ⋅ − − = −               (2) 
with the variance given by 
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j j j i j i t h i m w g g b b y Var     (3) 
where 
2 1 j j σ  is the  1 j  row,  2 j  column element of  b Σ  and 
2 1k k θ  is the  1 k  row,  2 k  column element 
of  . g Σ   Obviously, different species on the same parcel may interact in a variety of ways:  
predator/prey, competition for similar food sources, symbiotic relationships.  The interaction 
between species  1 i  and  2 i  on parcel h at time t is given by the covariance, 
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(4) 
In addition to the interaction of different species on the same parcel, the same species interact on 
different parcels as individuals or groups migrate in order to mate or to expand their territory.   
This interaction is given by the covariance between the same species on parcels  1 h  and  2 h  at 
time t or 
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k k k i k i t h i t h i m m w w g g y y Cov     (5) 
Finally, different species interact across different parcels which is given by the covariance 
between species  1 i  and  2 i  on parcels  1 h  and  2 h  at time t or  
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k k k i k i t h i t h i m m w w g g y y Cov     (6) 
  Given this stochastic behavior of species on the available parcels, we will suppose the 
objective of our planner is to maximize global diversity.  For this exercise, at least, we will take 
the measure of global diversity to be the Shannon index.  If we define species i’s global 
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may formally state the planner’s objective function to be maximized as:  
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y S                 (7) 
The above index takes on its maximum when all species are equally represented in the parcels 
total population.  By selecting parcels with the greatest index value, we are selecting parcels 
closest to this standard.  
As noted, one disadvantage of the Shannon index is that it places equal weights on 
species (i.e., a mosquito receives the same weight as a koala bear; a foundation species receives 
the same weight as a non-essential species).  Perhaps a weakness in the Shannon index we have 
presented thus far is this implicit indifference between species.  That is, interchanging the 
populations of mosquitoes with koalas does not impact the Shannon index value.  If our 
conservation organization has a preference ordering of the species, the Shannon index will fail to 
convey this ordering.  To allay these concerns, we may adapt our Shannon index to include a 
cross-entropy formulization. 
In statistics, a cross-entropy formulization allows the analyst to impart prior information 
into the estimation process (Golan et al, 1996).  In a biodiversity application, we can use the  
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cross-entropy specification to assign weights to the species.  To incorporate the preferences of 
the conservation organization, higher weights may be assigned to more preferred species.   
To allow for the assignment of greater benefits to a particular species, consider a  cross-




































q y C                 (8) 
where q is a N by 1 vector of species weights. The sum of the components of q must equal to 1 
(each element is nonnegative). 
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the effects of incorporating preference weights on species’ 
populations in the simple case with only two species.  The curve in Figure 1 represents the value 
of the Shannon index with no preference weights.  The horizontal axes measure the percentage of 
the parcels populations devoted to each species.  As the figure indicates, the Shannon index 
attains the highest value when each species is equally represented in the parcel’s population.  
Also, the curve is symmetric about this maximization point.  This demonstrates the property of 
the Shannon index that allows us to interchange species populations 1 and 2 and not impact the 
index value. 
This is not the case if we incorporate preference weights on the species.  For example, 
Figure 2 was produced from the incorporation of preference weights on the species by using (8).  
In particular, species 2 was assigned a larger weight than species 1.  The result, as Figure 2 
demonstrates, is that the curve is no longer maximized at the point where the species’ 
populations are equally represented on the parcel.  The maximization point occurs where species 
2 has the larger population.  This reflects the preference weights we have assigned.  Also, the 
curve is not symmetric.  Hence, interchanging species populations will not result in analogous  
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biodiversity index values.  This simple inclusion of the cross-entropy formulization may increase 
the efficacy of the Shannon index approach.  However, it presents us with an additional dilemma.  
That is, how do we assign the species preference weights in practice? 
  The answer is that it likely depends on the preferences of the conservation organization.  
The preference weights may indicate economic value or expectation of contributions to medical 
technologies.  The appealing notion of including a cross-entropy formulization is that preference 
orderings can be included in the analysis of biodiversity management.  However, since the 
preference orderings of the conservation organization is unknown, we will use the unweighted 
Shannon index as shown in (7).  
 
3. The Effects of Many Different, Spatially-Diverse Preserves or “Don’t Put All Your 
Genotypes in One Basket” 
To illustrate the effects of increasing the number of preserves on the overall total risk, 
measured in terms of variance of the Shannon index, we allow the number of equal sized parcels 
to increase.  As we have 10 interrelated parcels to manage, we can begin illustrating the gain 
from managing biodiversity as a portfolio theory application.
1  Multiple parcels allow the 
manager to diversify away from the parcel specific shocks and use the covariance between 
parcels to select an optimal combination of portfolios given the global shocks.  These global 
shocks represent the portion of risk to biodiversity that is common or systematic to all parcels, 
i.e., the risk that cannot be reduced by increasing the number of projects. 
Figure 3 illustrates the impact of parcel holdings on portfolio risk.  The vertical axis 
                     
1 Markowitz (1952) is considered to be the seminal portfolio theory work.  For a modern 
overview, see Bodie et al (2008).   
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measures standard deviation of our portfolio of biodiversity index values.  The horizontal axis 
indicates the number of parcels held in the portfolio.  As the graph indicates, increasing the 
number of parcels reduces the risk to our portfolio biodiversity index value.  If the manager 
selected only one parcel, his portfolio biodiversity value would fluctuate with the biodiversity of 
that single parcel.  In this case, that would entail a standard deviation in biodiversity index value 
of approximately 0.14.  If the manager equally allocated his resources between parcel 1 and 
parcel 2, the variance in his portfolio biodiversity index value would fall as Figure 3 indicates.  
As the number of parcels increase, the overall risk to biodiversity decreases to a point (see Figure 
3).  In general, we can demonstrate this result analytically.  Consider a conservancy organization 





2 1 S S D ⋅ + ⋅ = where D is 
the weighted average of diversity,  1 S  and  2 S  represent the biodiversity index on parcels 1 and 2, 







σ σ + + = D Var  As the 
number of the parcels increase, the total variance approaches the average covariance.  Simply 
noting that increasing the number of parcels preserved will reduce the risk to biodiversity does 
not answer the question of which specific parcels should be preserved.  Also, the typical 
portfolio selection that maximizes expected utility places restrictions on the distribution of 
returns.  Specifically, portfolio selection models that use a mean-variance criteria requires that 
the distribution of parcel returns be jointly normal.   
 
4. Stochastic Dominance as a Means of Project Selection 
To select optimal individual parcels, we use stochastic dominance.  Although it has its  
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origins in financial economics, stochastic dominance has been employed in various applications 
in agricultural and environmental economics.
2   Stochastic dominance requires no distributional 
restrictions nor exact form of the utility function is required.  To employ stochastic dominance, 
one needs only to make assumptions regarding the general characteristics of the conservation 
organization’s utility function with greater restrictions arising with higher orders of stochastic 
dominance (see Levy 1992).   
In the simplest form, a risky project,  1 h , has stochastic dominance over risky project,  2 h , 
if  1 h delivers a preferred outcome relative to  2 h  in every state of nature.  There are three forms of 
stochastic dominance, each with progressively stronger assumptions regarding a conservation 
organization’s preferences.  First-order stochastic dominance assumes only that conservation 
organizations prefer more to less or U( 1 h )>U( 2 h ) where U(•) is the conservation’s utility 
function and parcel  1 h  is richer in biodiversity than parcel  2 h .  If this is the case, the 
stochastically dominant parcel is the one that provides the conservation organization with greater 
returns in every state of nature.  More formally, parcel  1 h  is preferred to parcel  2 h  if, when 
returns are ranked from lowest to highest, the cumulative probability of returns for  1 h  is never 
greater and is sometimes less than the cumulative probability of returns for  2 h . 
Second-order stochastic dominance makes the additional assumption that conservation 
organizations are risk averse.  If conservation organizations prefer more to less and are risk 
averse, then parcel  1 h  dominates parcel  2 h  with second-order stochastic dominance if the sum of 
the cumulative probabilities of all returns is never greater with  1 h  than with  2 h  and is sometimes 
                     
2Other applications include conservation payments (Benítez et al. 2006), soil and water 
conservation (Bekele 2005) and community supported agriculture (Sanneh et al. 2001).  
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less.  By making this additional assumption, we can select the optimal parcel if the two 
cumulative frequency functions cross.  With second order stochastic dominance, it is no longer 
necessary that parcel  1 h  provides higher returns in every state of the world.  Because of the 
assumption of risk aversion, the conservation organization is willing to accept the probability of 
lower returns in some middle range with parcel  1 h  in order to have a lower probability of a very 
low return. 
Based on the earlier description of stochastic dominance, parcel  1 h  is said to second-
order stochastically dominant parcel  2 h  if: 
1.  the planner prefers higher diversity to less, 
2.  the planner is risk-averse, and 
3.  the sum of cumulative probabilities for all diversity values are never more with  1 h  
than  2 h  and sometimes less. 
To explore the implications of this stochastic dominance as a parcel selection mechanism, 
we have created 10 parcels (H=10).  The number of distinct species is set to be 100 (N=100).  
For the purposes of this simulation, we remove any influence of human development shocks.  To 
do this, we set  k i m , to zero for all i and k.  We allow for 12 parcel specific shock factors (J=12) 
and 6 global shock factors (K=6).  The parcel specific loading factors are randomly assigned 
according to:   ( ). 1 , 1 ~ , − Uniform b j i   Similarly, the global loading factors are assigned according 
to:  ( ). 1 , 1 ~ , − Uniform g k i   The variance-covariance matrix  b Σ  and  g Σ  appear in Tables 1 and 2, 
respectively.   
Once these parameterizations have been made, we have a stochastic distribution for  
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parcel diversity.  The cdf of these distributions appear in Table 3.  The first column of Table 3 
lists values of the biodiversity measure, S, while the remaining 10 columns correspond to cdf 
values for each of the ten parcels.  This table, for example, indicates that parcel 8 has a 1.2% 
chance of observing a biodiversity measure less than 3.06.  Parcel 9 has a 0.2% chance of 
observing a biodiversity measure less than 3.06. 
Our task is now to rank these parcels in accordance with stochastic dominance.  To 
demonstrate the parcel selection problem under uncertainty with the measure of biodiversity 
presented above, we propose the following simulation.  We have 10 (H=10) parcels available 
that our decision maker must choose from in conserving.  There are 100 (N=100) distinct species 
that may inhabit each parcel.  Each species was sequentially populated on each of the 10 parcels.  
The algorithm used to define the initial population was  ( ) 10 6 45 . 0 1 , , + − = h i y h i  for parcels 1 
through 5.  For parcels 6 through 10, the initial population was defined as 
( )( ) 10 5 100 45 . 0 1 , , + − − = h i y h i .  This structure creates a gradation of population characteristics 
across the ten parcels with some intended symmetries.  Parcel 1 and 10 are closely related.  For 
example, species 1 on parcel 1 has the same initial population as species 100 on parcel 10.  The 
parcel pairs (2, 9), (3, 8), (4,7), and (5, 6) share the same relationship.  
This does not imply that the stochastic behaviors of the parcel specific biodiversity 
measures are analogous.  This is because we are not imposing the shock loading factors to be 
equivalent.  The shock impact factors (parcel specific and global) were uniformly selected 
between -1 and 1.  The variance-covariance structure of the parcel specific shock terms was 
taken from an empirical variance-covariance structure of 12 (J=12) financial factors.  The 
variance-covariance structure of the global shock terms was taken from an empirical variance- 
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covariance structure of 6 (K=6) parameters in a demand study. These choices were selected out 
of convenience as they were readily available.
3    Our purpose in this simulation is to 
demonstrate the impact of uncertainty on our biodiversity and parcel selection modeling.  The 
heterogeneity in impact shock assignments will generate different biodiversity measure 
experiences across the distinct parcels.  Also, before the experiment, we have no a priori reason 
to find one parcel as superior to the other.  While some parcels have high overall populations 
(particularly parcels 1 and 10), others have greater overall initial biodiversity (especially parcels 
5 and 6).  We intentionally impose these conflicts to mimic the tradeoffs conservation managers 
confront in making decisions. 
Given the initial population settings, the biodiversity measures are initially highest for 
parcels 5 and 6 even though these parcels have the smallest initial population.  The parcel 
population is more uniformly assigned across species for each of parcels 5 and 6.  On parcels 5 
and 6, the most populous species is approximately 5.26 times larger than the least populous 
species.  On parcels 1 and 10, the most populous species is about19.18 times larger than the least 
populous species.  While parcels 5 and 6 have highest initial species biodiversity, their smaller 
species populations are also closer to the minimum sustainable values.  This suggests the parcels 
are likely to lose more species to extinction given particular negative species shocks.   
With these model parameters defined, we may now explore the ramifications of 
uncertainty on our biodiversity index.  For each simulation period, we drew the 12 parcel 
specific shock terms for each of the 10 parcels (120 parcel specific shock terms) and the 6 global 
shock terms.  Thus, a total of 126 random draws each period.  We then updated the species 
                     
3The correlation matrix for the specific shocks is reported in Table 1 while the variance-
covariance structure of the global shock terms is given in Table 2.  
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carrying-capacities on each parcel.  We did this for 500 periods for a complete simulation.  At 
the end of the 500 periods, we calculate each parcel’s biodiversity measure (8,000 random 
components as well as the defined parameters influence each parcel’s ending biodiversity 
measure).     
One simulation, however, only produces a single possible outcome, not necessarily the 
most likely, of biodiversity.  That is, a single observation of a random variable.  To investigate 
the stochastic behavior of biodiversity on our parcels, we constructed simulated cumulative 
density functions (cdf) for each parcel.  Each parcel had 1,000 replications of 500 periods.  The 
cdfs are shown for a few parcels in Figure 4.  The vertical axis measures the probability of 
observing a biodiversity index equal to or less than the horizontal distance to the curve.  The 
horizontal axis denotes the biodiversity index value for the parcel.  The parcels are ordered by 
first order stochastic dominance.  The curve furthest to the left reflects a stochastically 
dominated parcel.  That is, all other parcels stochastically dominate it as the probability of 
observing a particular biodiversity index value is always less for the remaining parcels.   
As we inspect the parcels further to the right in Figure 4, we see that a strict ordering of 
the parcels in accordance with first-order stochastic dominance is not possible.  This is because 
their cdfs intersect one another.  This indicates that in some ranges we have a parcel 
stochastically dominated by another, but the order of stochastic dominance reverses in this range 
after the cdfs cross.  This implies first-order stochastic dominance fails to identify a ranking for 
all parcels exhibiting this behavior. 
Figure 5 illustrates that examining the parcels with respect to second order stochastic 
dominance reduces this problem.  Recall that second order stochastic dominance adds the 
reasonable assumption that conservation organizations are risk averse.  By adding this  
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assumption and reporting the sum of the cdfs, Figure 5 allows us to order parcels that we could 
not previously rank.  We can now clearly identify which of these would be preferred.  However, 
there remain three parcels whose curves still cross, which are not included in this figure.  While 
the use of second order stochastic dominance is therefore an improvement in ranking parcels, it 
is not able to do so in every case.  However, all parcels can be ranked with 4
th order level 
stochastic dominance.  
 
5. Policy Implications and Conclusions 
  Diversification in the world of finance refers to holding a variety of assets in order to 
reduce risk.  In the world of biology, diversification in the form of preserving similar habitats in 
geographically diverse areas serves the same purpose.  The risks to biodiversity come from a 
variety of sources, some associated with human actions, some not.  Because some of these risks 
affect certain areas more severely than others, organizations concerned with protecting 
biodiversity can benefit from applying financial strategies for diversification.  Using simulations 
in which both global and localized shocks are imposed on parcels that may be persevered, we 
show that increasing the number of persevered parcels reduces risk.  However, like the risk 
associated with financial markets, not all risk to biodiversity (specifically, global shocks) can be 
eliminated through diversification. 
  We also consider the possibility of using stochastic dominance to rank parcels for 
preservation.  When choosing specific areas to preserve, conservation organizations take into 
account both the returns to preservation, i.e. the level of biodiversity, and the risks to that 
biodiversity that arise due to shocks.  Simulations indicate that stochastic dominance may be a 
useful tool in some cases, clearly indicating which parcels are preferred, but cannot differentiate  
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between all possible parcels. 
  The simulations included in this paper measure returns by using the Shannon-Weaver 
index of biodiversity.  However, this index assigns equal weights to all species in an area.  In 
reality, conservation organizations have indicated that they have definite preferences for some 
species over others.  For example, they may prefer native species to exotic invasive species, or 
they may have greater concern for a species that acts as a foundation species.  These preferences 
can be taken into account by using a cross-entropy formulization.  Additional simulations using 
such a weighted index will provide further insight into decision making by conservation 
organizations.  
  21 
References 
Alavalapati, Janaki R.R., George A. Stainback, and Douglas R. Carter, ARestoration of the 
Longleaf Pine Ecosystem on Private Lands in the US South: An Ecological Economic 
Analysis, Ecological Economics, 40, 411-419, 2002. 
 
Bekele, Wagayehu, “Stochastic Dominance Analysis of Soil and Water Conservation in 
Subsistence Crop Production in the Eastern Ethiopian Highlands: The Case of the Hunde-
Lafto Area,” Environmental and Resource Economics, 32, 533-550, 2005. 
 
Benítez, Pablo C., Timo Kuosmanen, Roland Olschewski and G. Cornelis van Kooten, 
“Conservation Payments under Risk: A Stochastic Dominance Approach,” American 
Journal of Agricultural Economics, 88, 1-15, 2006. 
 
Bodie, Zvi, Alex Kane and Alan J. Marcus, Investments, McGraw-Hill, 2008. 
 
Brown, Gardner M. and Jason F. Shogren, AEconomics of the Endangered Species Act,@ Journal 
of Economic Perspectives, 12, 3, 3-20, 1998. 
 
Chambers, Catherine and John Whitehead, “A Contingent Valuation Estimate of the Value of  
Wolves in Minnesota,”, Environmental and Resource Economics, 26(2), 249-267, 2003. 
 
Golan, A., G. Judge, and D. Miller, Maximum Entropy Econometrics: Robust  
Estimation with Limited Data, Wiley: New York, 1996. 
 
Innes, Robert, Stephen Polasky, and John Tschirhart, ATakings, Compensation, and Endangered 
Species Protection on Private Lands,@ Journal of Economic Perspectives, 12, 3, 35-52, 
1998. 
 
Levy, Haim, Stochastic Dominance: Survey and Analyses," Management Science, 38, 555-593, 
1992. 
 
Loomis, John B., and Douglas S. White, AEconomic Benefits of Rare and Endangered Species: 
Summary and Meta-Analysis,@ Ecological Economics, 18, 197-206, 1996. 
 
Ludwig, Donald, Ray Hilborn, and Carl Walters, "Uncertainty, Resource Exploitation, and 
Conservation: Lessons from History," Science, 260, 5104, pp. 17 - 36, 2 April 1993. 
 
Markowitz, Harry M., “Portfolio Selection,” Journal of Finance, 7, 77-91, 1952. 
 
Michael, Jeffrey A., and Dean Lueck, APreemptive Habitat Destruction Under the Endangered 
Species Act,@ Journal of Law and Economics, 46, 27–60, 2003. 
  
  22 
Montgomery, C., G. Brown Jr., and M. Darius. “The Marginal Cost of Species Preservation: The 
Northern Spotted Owl,” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 26:111-
128, 1994. 
 
Noss, Reed F. and Allen Cooperrider, Saving Nature's Legacy Protecting and Restoring 
Biodiversity Island Press: Washington, D.C., 1994. 
 
Polasky, Stephen, Holly Doremus, and Bruce Rettig, AEndangered Species Conservation on 
Private Land,@ Contemporary Economic Policy, 15, 4, 66-77, 1996.  
 
Rubin, J., G. Helfand, and J. Loomis, “A Benefit-Cost Analysis of the Northern Spotted Owl,” 
Journal of Forestry, 89, 25-30, 1991. 
 
Simpson, E. H., “Measurement of Biodiversity,” Nature, 163, 1949. 
 
Simpson, R. David, “Definitions of Biodiversity and Measures of Its Value,” Discussion Paper 
02-62, Resources for the Future, 2002. 
 
Solow, Andrew, Stephen Polasky and James Broadus, “On the Measurement of Biological 
Diversity,”  Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 24, pp. 60-68, 1993. 
 
Spellerberg, I.F., Monitoring Ecological Change, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1991. 
 
Weikard, Hans-Peter, “Diversity Functions and the Value of Biodiversity,” Land Economics, v. 
78, 20-27, 2002.  
 
Weitzman, Martin L., "On Diversity," Quarterly Journal of Economics,  v. 107, pp. 363-405, 
1992.  
 
Weitzman, Martin L., "What to Preserve? An Application of Diversity Theory to Crane 
Conservation," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 108 (Feb.): 157-83, 1993.  
 
Weitzman, Martin L., “Diversity Functions,” in  Biodiversity Loss: Economic and Ecological 
Issues, ed. by Charles Perrings, Karl-Göran Mäler, Carl Folke, C.S. Holling, and Bengt-
Owe Jansson, Oxford University Press, Oxford, England, 1995. 
 
Weitzman, Martin L., "The Noah's Ark Problem," Econometrica, v. 66, pp. 1279-98, 1998. 
 
Whitehead, John C., “Contingent Values for Coastal and Marine Wildlife: Specification,  
Validity, and Valuation Issues,” Marine Resource Economics, 8, 119-132, 1993.  
  
  23 
Figure 1 









  24 
  
Figure 2 





  25 
Figure 3 
Conservation Organization’s Risk over Parcels 
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Figure 4 
Ordered by First Stochastic Dominance 
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Figure 5 
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Table 1: Parcel Specific Shock Correlations 
 
  1 ε   2 ε   3 ε   4 ε   5 ε   6 ε   7 ε   8 ε   9 ε   10 ε   11 ε   12 ε  
1 ε   1  0.1  -0.5  0.5  0.6  -0.2  -0.1  0.4  0.2  0.0  0.3  -0.5 
2 ε   0.1  1  0.2  -0.0  0.3  -0.2  -0.6  -0.3  -0.1  0.1  0.1  -0.3 
3 ε   -0.5  0.2  1  -0.2  -0.3  0.1  -0.1  -0.2  0.0  0.2  -0.2  0.2 
4 ε   0.5  -0.0  -0.2  1  0.4  -0.0  0.0  0.4  0.1  0.1  0.1  -0.3 
5 ε   0.6  0.3  -0.3  0.4  1  -0.4  -0.4  0.3  0.2  0.1  0.5  -0.8 
6 ε   -0.2  -0.2  0.1  -0.0  -0.4  1  0.4  -0.2  -0.1  -0.0  -0.1  0.3 
7 ε   -0.1  -0.6  -0.1  0.0  -0.4  0.4  1  0.2  -0.2  -0.2  -0.3  0.5 
8 ε   0.4  -0.3  -0.2  0.4  0.3  -0.2  0.2  1  0.2  -0.1  -0.1  -0.0 
9 ε   0.2  -0.1  0.0  0.1  0.2  -0.1  -0.2  0.2  1  0.2  0.2  -0.2 
10 ε   0.0  0.1  0.2  0.1  0.1  -0.0  -0.2  -0.1  0.2  1  0.3  -0.2 
11 ε   0.3  0.1  -0.2  0.1  0.5  -0.1  -0.3  -0.1  0.2  0.3  1  -0.5 
12 ε   -0.5  -0.3  0.2  -0.3  -0.8  0.3  0.5  -0.0  -0.2  -0.2  -0.5  1 
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Table 2: Global Shocks Variance-Covariance Structure 
 
  1 ν   2 ν   3 ν   4 ν   5 ν   6 ν  
1 ν   0.132  0.004  0.002  0.002  0.000  -0.004 
2 ν   0.004  4.034  2.002  0.361  0.073  -3.207 
3 ν   0.002  2.002  1.135  0.159  0.041  -1.646 
4 ν   0.002  0.361  0.159  1.395  0.0483  -0.459 
5 ν   0.000  0.073  0.041  0.0483  0.003  -0.065 
6 ν   -0.004  -3.207  -1.646  -0.459  -0.065  2.594 
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Table 3: Biodiversity cdf 
 
S  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 
3.06  .006  .002  .002  .001  .008  .003  .004  .012  .002  .004 
3.15  .015  .012  .003  .001  .034  .003  .008  .034  .005  .020 
3.23  .038  .030  .012  .004  .103  .013  .028  .093  .019  .065 
3.32  .097  .075  .026  .017  .241  .035  .077  .212  .059  .184 
3.41  .220  .169  .066  .054  .449  .106  .175  .397  .156  .393 
3.49  .437  .329  .168  .156  .693  .231  .389  .641  .330  .626 
3.58  .665  .570  .344  .308  .889  .446  .657  .848  .548  .823 
3.66  .873  .799  .562  .543  .979  .672  .853  .964  .781  .952 
3.75  .973  .939  .764  .775  .995  .864  .957  .996  .915  .991 
3.83  .997  .987  .913  .923  .999  .970  .995  1.000  .983  .999 
 
 